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Momentum Investing: The Case of High-Tech IPOs 
Abstract: 
We document significant momentum effects in the high-tech IPO aftermarket beyond the 
initial (underpricing) run-up. Cumulative market-adjusted returns (CMARs) reveal a striking 
pattern. A local peak of just over 10 percent is reached around 20 trading days post-IPO 
coinciding with the expiry of the “quiet period”. A global peak (of about 33 percent) is reached 
after 105 trading days. The CMAR decays fairly rapidly thereafter possibly in anticipation of the 
expiry of the six-month lockup period.  Further, we find strong evidence of a linkage between 
technical ex-ante observable variables and the momentum build-up.  We conjecture that visceral 
factors may at least partially underlie the investor behavior that gives rise to the bubble-like 
CMAR pattern. 
                                                  
Momentum Investing: The Case of High-Tech IPOs 
Introduction: 
The profitability of momentum strategies is relatively well documented in the literature.  
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001) show that a naïve strategy that involves buying recent 
winners and shorting recent losers and holding the position for up to twelve months earns 
significant positive risk-adjusted returns.  However cumulative returns begin to decay soon 
thereafter and in some cases turn negative for holding periods beyond a three-year period.  These 
studies cover long sample periods and virtually all stocks listed on the major US exchanges and 
imply support for behavioral models developed in response to the mounting empirical evidence 
against market efficiency. 1  These large scale studies of momentum effects contribute to our 
understanding of investor behavior and are therefore important, regardless of where one stands 
on the market efficiency debate.  However, in our opinion there is also something to be gained 
from examining momentum ‘in the small’.   
Our study looks at momentum effects in a sample of 301 high-tech IPOs launched in 
1998-99 measured over a six-month period.  We feel that our sample choice is interesting and 
appropriate for a number of reasons.  There has been a great deal of commentary in various 
outlets about post-IPO market dynamics.  This includes the issue of flipping activity by investors 
who receive allocations at the offer price, price stabilization activity by underwriters, the 
initiation of coverage by analysts and the price effects at the expiry of the quiet and lock-up 
periods.2  Also, IPO underpricing was at its height during the technology bubble of the late 1990s 
1 See Daniel et al (1998), Barberis et al (1998) and Hong and Stein (1999). 

2 See Aggarwal (2000, 2003) on price stabilization and flipping respectively; Bradley et al (2003) on 

analyst coverage and the quiet period; Field and Hanka (2001) on lock-up expiration.  

   
 
 
                                                 
 
 
(see Loughran and Ritter (2003)). Therefore we felt that a look at high-tech IPO aftermarket 
patterns was likely to be instructive and revealing at the possible cost of some generality.3 
In a strictly rational setting, the market-adjusted return series in a post-IPO environment 
ought to be random.  Let’s assume that average initial underpricing is driven by economically 
sound reasons.4 Once this has been sorted out by the market and given the SEC rules about no 
new fundamental information release (or the requirement of a ‘quiet period’) for twenty-five 
calendar days, there is no obvious rationale for a systematic direction in post-IPO returns.   
However, we find significant evidence of momentum beyond the initial (underpricing) 
run-up. Cumulative market-adjusted returns (CMAR) reveal a striking pattern.  A local peak of 
just over 10 percent is reached around 20 trading days post-IPO coinciding with the expiry of the 
'quiet period'.  A global peak (of about 33 percent) is reached after 105 trading days.  The CMAR 
decays fairly rapidly thereafter possibly in anticipation of the expiry of the six-month lockup 
period. The results are especially compelling when the sample is segregated on the basis of the 
initial (Day 1) market reaction.  Not only do the above momentum patterns prevail for each sub-
sample, the CMAR peak is significantly higher for firms who fare well on Day 1.  Although the 
initial market reaction seems to trigger aftermarket momentum, its effect is short lived.  We
implement a model that relates the probability of crossing a desired return threshold to
momentum, fundamental, and IPO contract-specific variables.  We show that trading on Day 1 
momentum signals achieves considerable separation in the expected probability of crossing the 
threshold. We conjecture that momentum investing in the post-IPO context is driven at least 
partially by visceral factors. 
3 Jaggia and Thosar (2003) employ a similar sample to formulate and test hypotheses based on the Daniel 
et al (1998) investor overconfidence and self-attribution bias theory. 
4 These could be the Rock (1986) winner’s curse argument, the Benveniste and Spindt (1989) information 
revelation story or perhaps more relevant in the context of our sample: the changes in insider incentives 
suggested by Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003). 
 

  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, we present research questions 
and detailed discussion of our results. Section 3 contains concluding comments. 
2. Research Questions and Data Analysis:
Our primary sample was drawn from ipo.com to identify all high-tech IPO firms from
January 1, 1998 through October 30, 1999.  Daily open prices for each of the 301 firms in the 
sample and the corresponding NASDAQ index level are downloaded for 125 trading days 
(approximately six months) beyond the IPO date from yahoo finance and edreyfus.com. 5  The 
cumulative market-adjusted return (CMAR) is calculated as:  
P Pit	 i1CMAR it = // −1P Pmt m1 
Pit represents the Day t open price of the ith firm and Pmt is the corresponding market (Nasdaq) 
index and t refers to the time from the IPO date. 
At the outset, we simply graph the equally-weighted portfolio CMAR in event time for 
125 trading days (see Figure 1).6  We choose day 2 as the starting point because we wish to 
exclude the initial (underpricing) spike and Day 1 effects that might serve to explain post-IPO 
market patterns.  The shape of the graph is rather striking.  There appears to be at least prima 
facie evidence of momentum investing.  To our mind, at least two broad research questions arise 
from observing this CMAR pattern: 
1) 	 What economic, institutional and/or behavioral forces underlie momentum investing in 
the high-tech IPO context?
5 We decided on a six-month window to avoid any complicating biases arising from the market correction 

in mid 2000. Further this short observation interval of six-months precludes post-IPO events such as 

mergers, seasoned offerings. 

6 We remind the reader that CMAR represents market-adjusted but not risk-adjusted cumulative returns.  

Risk adjustment using traditional single- or multi-factor market models is not feasible in an IPO event 

context. 

 

  
 
 
  
                                                 
2) Can this post-IPO momentum be explained and/or exploited using ex-ante observable 
factors?
The first research question regarding the CMAR pattern in Figure 1 is difficult to address 
directly. Fortunately, there is an emerging body of literature dealing with IPO aftermarket 
dynamics that one could draw upon to make some inferences.  For instance, the local peak of 10 
percent that we observe at 20 trading days post-IPO coincides with the expiry of the 'quiet 
period' imposed by the SEC. 7  Bradley et al (2003) show that most of the aftermarket abnormal 
returns for IPO firms, where analyst coverage is initiated immediately, occurs in the run-up to 
the expiry of the quiet period (see their Figure 1, page 13).  Likewise, in our sample the CMAR 
jumps by 7.3 percent between post-IPO trading day 13 and 20 even though we do not control for 
analyst coverage. It is reasonable to assume that underwriters engage in price stabilization 
activities (of which inducing wider analyst coverage may be an informal part) in the days 
following the IPO and for our sample at least, they seem to have considerable success.8 
There is a drop-off in the CMAR from just over 10 percent to 5.5 percent during the 10 
trading days after the quiet period expiration, possibly due to delayed flipping.  However, it does 
not take long for the momentum to build again.  After oscillating in the 6-7 percent range for 
another 20 or so trading days, the CMAR begins to trend sharply upward reaching a peak of 33 
percent on trading day 105. The CMAR declines rapidly beyond this peak as we approach the 
six-month mark or the outer limit of our observation period.  The most plausible explanation for 
the decline is that the market is recognizing the imminent expiration of the standard lock-up 
period and the probable onset of insider selling.  A number of papers have documented high 
7 Under SEC regulations, firms and underwriters can make statements of fact but not issue forward-
looking opinions for a period of 25 calendar days (recently extended to 40) after the IPO date. 
8 Aggarwal (2000) has shown that rather than posting a stabilizing bid, underwriters engage in less 
transparent price support activities, which includes penalizing early flipping. 
 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
volumes and significantly negative returns on lock-up expiration (see, for example, Field and 
Hanka (2001)). 
We use regression analysis to address the second research question whether post-IPO 
momentum is explained using ex-ante observable factors.  A number of momentum, fundamental 
and IPO contract-specific explanatory variables are used for the analysis. Our choice of variables 
may appear to be somewhat ad hoc but this goes with the territory of exploratory research in 
general (i.e., the anomalies literature) and momentum studies in particular.  We believe that our 
study has generated interesting and provocative results, which are discussed below.   
Four momentum variables are included.  Percentage Price Change, the change from the 
offer price to the open price, represents the initial underpricing (or overpricing).  One could view 
the offer price as book value and the open price as market value; thus this variable could be 
loosely construed as a market/book factor.  If this variable is a risk factor, we would expect a 
negative effect on post-IPO returns; alternatively it could also be a momentum factor in which 
case it would have a positive sign.  Day 1 Adjusted Return is hypothesized as a momentum
variable representing the market-adjusted return on the first day of trading and Day 1 Volatility 
(High/Low) captures immediate post-IPO investor uncertainty. Day 1 Volume (Volume/Number 
of Shares) serves as a proxy for investor activity. If it is viewed as a crude flipping indicator, it 
should have a negative impact; alternatively it could be a second-order momentum variable. 
Fundamental variables include Net Income/Revenue, net income divided by revenue in 
the pre-IPO year, representing a proxy for firm quality. Log Revenue is included because a 
profitability variable may not be relevant in a high-tech IPO context.  Many analysts had 
discarded traditional valuation metrics during the technology boom of the late 1990s.  Age before 
the IPO, the number of years from the date the firm was incorporated to the IPO date, represents 
 

  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
a second-order proxy for firm quality.  Log Offer Size, offer price multiplied by the number of
shares sold in the IPO, is a proxy for size and a potential risk factor. 
For IPO contract-specific variables, Underwriter Reputation takes value 1 if the Carter-
Manaster rank exceeds 7; 0 otherwise. It has been used in previous work to explain 
underpricing.  If accurate pricing goes together with underwriter reputation, we expect post-IPO 
distortions to be reduced. Green Shoe Dummy is a dummy variable for a green shoe provision in 
the IPO contract. This provision gives the underwriter the option to purchase additional shares at 
the offer price to cover over allotments.  It also potentially serves as a post-IPO price 
stabilization mechanism. Internet Dummy takes value 1 if the IPO firm belongs either to the 
Internet services or Internet software sectors. We include this variable to capture the sentiment 
that internet related IPOs tended to be talked up in business press. 
The data sources for the above variables are ipo.com, FISonline, Hoovers.com, and 
Carter, Dark and Singh (1998).  For descriptive statistics, we ordered each variable and split it up
into four equal quartile segments (see Table 1).  Means are calculated for all observations and for 
each of the four segments.  Firms appear to be fairly homogenous with respect to fundamental 
variables, especially revenue and offer size. However, the initial underpricing and market 
reaction variables are remarkably different across quartile segments. 
We start the analysis with an OLS regression with the six-month CMAR as the dependent 
variable and all explanatory variables as defined above (see column 2 of Table 2).  Day 1
adjusted return exerts a positive influence on the six-month CMAR but is only weakly 
significant. The only variables that are strongly significant are: underwriter reputation and the 
Internet identification. We interpret this to mean that, as the CMAR graphs suggest, momentum
investing begins to wane before the six-month mark is reached.  Therefore, any investment 
 

  
 
 
strategy built around ex-ante technical factors involves cashing out either once a certain  
threshold is reached or in any case no later than around 105 trading days after the IPO.   
Therefore, following Jaggia and Thosar (2003), we define an event when the CMAR for a 
firm exceeds a 25 (or 50) percent threshold at any time over the six-month observation period.  
These market-adjusted return thresholds are set arbitrarily but high enough to reflect momentum
investing. Recall that we specifically exclude the initial run-up (offer price to day 0 open price) 
and the day 1 return (day 0 open to day 1 open prices) from the CMAR calculation; these may 
reflect the incorporation of information not contained in the prospectus or other public domain 
information sources. 
The regression results of a logit regression for the 25% and 50% thresholds are reported 
in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.  None of the fundamental proxies: pre-IPO profitability, revenue, 
age or size is significant and this is not necessarily surprising because we expect this information 
to be incorporated in the offer and/or initial market prices.  The underwriter reputation variable 
appears to have a significantly positive impact on post-IPO momentum.  This makes sense if the 
efficacy of price stabilization activity or the potency of analyst recommendations is tied to 
underwriter prestige. There is mounting evidence that analyst recommendations especially 
during the late 1990s bubble period were highly optimistic.  Also, analysts tend to initiate 
coverage with a 'buy' or 'strong buy' recommendation (Bradley et al (2003)).  It has been 
suggested that IPO firms trade off underpricing for favorable analyst coverage (Loughran and 
Ritter (2003)).  We also find that for the 50 percent threshold, identification as an Internet firm
within the high-tech context contributes to momentum.   
Initial underpricing (our percentage price change variable) has a significantly negative 
influence on post-IPO momentum.  It appears that the market views underpricing as a risk factor 
 

  
                                                 
 
rather than a momentum signal.  Perhaps our most intriguing finding is that the day 1 adjusted 
return is a strongly positive predictor of momentum. In order to gauge how useful the factors, 
identified as significant by our logit model, were in a speculative investment context, we carry 
out sensitivity analyses on these factors. The results are reported in Table 3.  For example, if all 
other factors are considered at their overall mean values but the day 1 adjusted return is 
evaluated sequentially at the means of four quartile segments (see Table 1), our model predicts 
the expected probability of reaching the 25 percent threshold as 55.9 percent for the bottom
quartile versus 75.4 percent for the top quartile - a not inconsiderable separation. 
Sensitivity results along similar lines are reported for: percentage price change, day 1 
volume and underwriter reputation. It is worth noting that day 1 volume, which we categorized 
as a potential second-order momentum variable, is significant only for the 50 percent threshold.  
Apparently high volume on day 1 is not a deterrent to new investors despite claims in the 
business press of flipping activity by those allocated shares in the IPO.  Aggarwal (2003) shows 
that contrary to popular belief initial flipping volume is quite modest. 
For further raw analysis of CMAR, we sort our sample on the basis of day 1 adjusted 
return and form four equally-weighted event time CMAR portfolios for 125 trading days based 
on quartile segments (see graphs in Figure 2).  The first point to note is that the peaks and 
troughs for the four portfolios largely track each other and bear a close resemblance to the graph 
for the total sample shown in Figure 1.9  The second point is that investors can benefit a great 
deal if they make their move after observing the day 1 return.  All four CMAR series reach their 
global peaks at approximately the same time: 105 trading days for the top quartile segment (S4) 
9 This is also an informal robustness check of in-sample integrity.  Our investigation of momentum
investing owes its rationale to the CMAR pattern in Figure 1 and it is reassuring that this pattern repeats 
in sub-samples. 
 

  
 
 
                                                 
and 112 trading days for the bottom quartile segment (S1).  But the difference in magnitude is 
startling: 53 percent for S4 versus only 15 percent for S1. 
To summarize: the CMAR patterns (Figures 1 and 2) indicate the presence of momentum
investing, the logit regression results imply that ex-ante technical factors such as the day1
adjusted return can be used to predict the momentum (defined as the probability of reaching a 
pre-specified return threshold) and the sensitivity analysis confirms that the separation between 
the probability estimates – say between the top and bottom quartile segments for a given factor – 
is large enough to make a difference in devising a trading strategy. 
3. Concluding Comments: 
In this paper, we study the phenomenon of momentum investing using a relatively narrow 
sample of high-tech IPOs launched in the late 1990s.  Cumulative market-adjusted returns 
measured starting from day 2 after the IPO and tracked for six-months reveal a pronounced 
bubble-like pattern. Our overall findings are largely consistent with various recent studies that 
have examined IPO aftermarket dynamics such as price effects at quiet period and lock-up 
expiration. Further analysis with a logit model demonstrates that technical factors observable ex-
ante have considerable power in terms of predicting the probability of exceeding pre-specified 
return thresholds. 
Even in the context of our late 1990s sample period, the magnitude and pattern of the 
CMAR appears anomalous.  It almost seems as if there was a bubble within a bubble and the 
place to look for an explanation is probably somewhere in the burgeoning literature on 
behavioral finance.10  We offer some conjectures about the kind of investor behavior that might 
give rise to the momentum effects we document without invoking the most widely cited 
10 See Barberis and Thaler (2003) for a useful survey. 
 

   
                                                 
 
behavioral models in the finance literature11. We choose to do this not because we believe these 
models do not apply but simply to introduce a new flavor into the mix.  
Loewenstein (2000) discusses the role of visceral factors in determining human behavior.  
In general, individuals are either in a 'hot' state, where emotions or visceral factors dominate, or a 
'cold state' where decisions are guided by rational thought processes.  The important 
psychological insight is the 'empathy gap' between hot and cold states.  This means that 
individuals do not learn from mistakes made while in a hot state and are in a sense prone to 
repeat them.  Loewenstein argues that visceral factors play a critical role in inter-temporal choice 
and may explain anomalous risk-taking behavior such as the simultaneous purchase of insurance 
and gambling. 
We think it is plausible that visceral factors at least partially underlie momentum
investing, which gives rise to bubble-like patterns.  In an investment context: hyped-up analyst 
reports, enthusiastic but not necessarily informative coverage on TV channels, Internet chat 
rooms and bulletin boards, word of mouth etc. probably induce investors to switch from cold to 
hot states with predictable consequences for the late comers.  Moreover, the so-called empathy 
gap ensures that even burned investors are unlikely to learn from the experience. 
We don't want to make too much of this line of reasoning.  It is quite possible that these 
visceral factors affect only a small proportion of investors and a narrow range of stocks: micro-
caps, IPOs, takeover targets etc. In any case, it would be nearly impossible to test behavioral 
hypotheses directly from market data – controlled laboratory experiments may well be the most 
fruitful way to gain a deeper understanding of this type of investor behavior.  And, if 
Loewenstein (and others) are right, it may not be enough for finance theorists to build models 
with dichotomies like: informed versus uniformed, over-confident versus conservative, news­
11 See references in footnote 1, Delong et al (1990) and Shiller (1984).
 

 watchers versus trend-chasers.  It may be necessary to model a schizophrenic investor who 
switches between hot and cold states.  The hunt for a unified theory that would explain all the 
observed empirical anomalies seems destined to be a long one. 
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Table 1. Overall and Quartile Segments Means of Variables 
Parameters All S1 S2 S3 S4 
Percentage Price Change 61.92 -1.75 20.04 51.01 167.66 
Day 1 Adjusted Return 5.28 -15.22 -3.17 4.96 32.73
Day 1 Volatility (High/Low) 31.04 8.88 19.99 30.67 62.90
Day 1 Volume (Vol/#Shares) 1.27 0.20 0.87 1.50 2.44 
Net Income/Revenue -1.77 -6.24 -1.10 -0.31 0.42 
Log Revenue 16.03 13.51 15.68 16.69 18.16
Age 5.33 1.31 3.15 4.72 11.65
Log Offer Size 17.94 16.96 17.71 18.07 18.96
Underwriter Reputation 0.80 0.20 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Green Shoe Dummy 0.57 0.00 0.29 1.00 1.00 
Internet Dummy 0.60 0.00 0.41 1.00 1.00 
For each variable, observations are ordered and split up into four equal quartile segments.  Means are 
calculated for all observations and for each of the four segments, Sj. 
 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Analysis of the 6-month Adjusted Returns and 25% and 50% thresholds 
Parameters 6-month 25% Threshold 50% Threshold 
40.44 -0.471 -1.791Constant (0.287) (-0.159) (-0.672) 
-0.08 -0.003* -0.004* Percentage Price Change (-1.031) (-2.053) (-2.158) 
0.60** 0.018* 0.016* Day 1 Adjusted Return (1.726) (2.362) (2.066) 
-0.53 -0.009 -0.002Day 1 Volatility (High/Low) (-1.635) (-1.141) (-0.322) 
1.97 0.286 0.344* Day 1 Volume (Vol/#Shares) (0.225) (1.616) (2.045) 
-4.26** -0.071 0.001 Net Income/Revenue (-1.760) (-1.549) (0.029) 
3.66 0.039 0.071 Log Revenue (0.835) (0.491) (0.879) 
0.18 0.026 -0.000Age (0.143) (0.891) (-0.004) 
-7.34 -0.042 -0.022Log Offer Size (-0.829) (-0.234) (-0.130) 
49.84* 0.839* 0.572** Underwriter Reputation (2.863) (2.518) (1.708) 
1.69 0.221 0.244 Green Shoe Dummy (0.126) (0.824) (0.934) 
29.77* 0.247 0.583* Internet Dummy (2.109) (0.877) (2.100) 
Coefficient estimates with t-statistics in parentheses; * and ** denote significance at 5 and 10 percent 
level respectively.  A linear regression model is used to analyze 6-month returns and a logit model for the 
25% and 50% threshold returns. All returns are calculated from Day 2. 
 

  
    
 
    
  
   
   
   
   
    
   
   
   
   
   
  
   
   
   
   
    
  
   
   
 
Table 3: Expected Probability of reaching the thresholds for Various Factors. 
Variable 25% Threshold 50% Threshold 
Average 64.88% 53.21% 
Percentage Price Change 
-1.75 
20.04
51.01
167.66 
69.09%
 67.68%
 65.62%
57.39%
58.78%
56.89%
54.17%
43.85%
Day 1 Adjusted Return 
-15.22 
-3.17 
4.96 
32.73
55.90%
61.27%
64.75%
 75.37%
45.18%
49.89%
53.08%
63.62%
Day 1 Volume 
0.20 
0.87 
1.50 
2.44 
57.64%
62.26%
66.38%
72.10%
44.04%
49.80%
55.19%
63.00%
Underwriter Reputation 
1 
0 
68.59%
48.55%
56.03%
41.83%
1The expected probability is calculated as where x s′  represents the quartile segment −∑ ˆ j j )1 exp(  β x+ 
means of the indicated variable along with the overall means of all other variables. 
 

  
 
 
Figure 1. Cumulative Market Adjusted Returns in the 6-month post IPO Period
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The graph represents performance of an equally-weighted event time CMAR portfolio comprising all 301 
firms. The CMAR measure excludes the initial underpricing run-up and the Day 1 market-adjusted return 
by creating the portfolio on Day 2.
 

  
  
  
Figure 2. Cumulative Market Adjusted Returns for quartile segments formed on the basis 
of Day 1 Adjusted Return 
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The data are sorted on the basis of day 1 adjusted return to form four equally-weighted event time CMAR 
portfolios.  The portfolios vary consistently on the basis of day 1 adjusted return with the top (bottom)
graph representing the top (bottom) quartile segment.  As in Figure 1, the CMAR measure excludes the 
initial underpricing run-up and the Day 1 market-adjusted return by creating the portfolio on Day 2. 
 

